|Statement||by Christian Calmès.|
|Series||Bank of Canada working paper -- 2005-1, Working paper (Bank of Canada) -- 2005-1.|
|Contributions||Bank of Canada.|
|The Physical Object|
|Pagination||v, 33 p. ;|
|Number of Pages||33|
Self-Enforcing Labour Contracts and the Dynamics Puzzle. Since I fo cus on the dynamics puzzle in this paper, the theory of self-enforcing labour con tra cts pro vides another, more b eneﬁcial, feature. The contract insures t he work er. Get this from a library! Self-enforcing labour contracts and the dynamics puzzle. [Christian Calmes; Bank of Canada.]. The author proposes a theoretical validation of a micro-founded internal-propagation mechanism: he builds a model that features a limited-commitment economy, and derives endogenous self-enforcing labour contracts that produce a different linkage between the real wage and the marginal product of : Christian Calmès.
The author proposes a theoretical validation of a micro-founded internal-propagation mechanism: he builds a model that features a limited-commitment economy, and derives endogenous self-enforcing labour contracts that produce a different linkage between the real wage and the marginal product of by: Self-Enforcing Labour Contracts and the Dynamics Puzzle Staff Working Papers, Bank of Canada ; Financial Market Imperfection, Overinvestment,and Speculative Precaution Staff Working Papers, Bank of Canada View citations (1) Financial Market Imperfections and Investment: an Overview Finance, University Library of Munich, Germany View. *Thomas and Worrall (), \Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts," Review of Economic Studies. *Harris and Holmstrom (), \A Theory of Wage Dynamics," Review of Economic Studies. *Thomas and Worrall (), \Foreign Direct Investment and the Risk of Expropriation," Review of Economic Studies. 4File Size: 82KB. rationing, implicit labour contracts, regulation, insurance, labour contracts, contracts as barri-ers to entry, costly state veriﬂcation. Bolton and Dewatripont, Chapter 2. Laﬁont and Martimort, Chapters 2 and 3. Myerson (), \Optimal Coordination Mechanisms in Generalized PrincipalAgent Problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics.
A 'read' is counted each time someone views a publication summary (such as the title, abstract, and list of authors), clicks on a figure, or views or downloads the full-text. Author(s): Jonathan Thomas & Tim Worrall. Abstract: We examine long-term wage contracts between a risk-neutral firm and a risk-averse worker when both can costlessly renege and buy or sell labour at a random spot market wage. A self-enforcing contract is one in which neither party ever has an incentive to renege. The contract is on the basis of Tashi Kandi/masonry works only and the contractor undertake the execution/construction of a specific work all its contingencies to complete it in an respects With in a specific time for a fixed rate of construction Rs____/- (Rupees_____Only) per square ft. DETAILS OF EXTRA WORKS & ABSTRACT OF Size: KB. Self-Enforcing Wage Contract and the Dynamics Puzzle Christian Calmès Particle Economics Sawhill B., Brown M., Herriot J. and Palmrose Z.V. Empirical investigation and modeling of a financial market after a crash Fabrizio Lillo and Rosario Mantegna The Brazilian Depression in the s and s.